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Intergovernmental Relations in England: Bridging 




1. COVID-19 and its economic fallout have placed significant strain on relations 
between central and local government in England. The pandemic has exposed 
Westminster to the consequences of recent sub-national devolution.  
2. The poor communications between UK Government and local leaders, exemplified 
by recent high profile interventions from England’s Metro Mayors, highlight how a 
decade of institutional churn has hollowed out intergovernmental structures that 
could help to co-ordinate responses to health, economic and environmental crises.  
3. Intergovernmental relations are fundamental to multi-level systems of government, 
but are now underdeveloped in England. The 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum and Brexit have prompted renewed focus on intergovernmental relations 
between UK Government and the devolved nations. A similar debate should now 
follow on the appropriate mechanisms to manage relations between central and local 
government in England.  
4. Proposed institutional fixes could include an English Leaders’ Forum, incorporating 
mayors and combined authority leaders from across the nation, along with UK 
Government ministers.  
5. Government should also seek to move away from “deal-based” approaches to local 
funding, which are hugely time consuming for all parties and encourage central-local 
friction. More comprehensive devolved funding arrangements have potential to be 
more efficient and provide freedom for local leaders to direct resources where they 
are needed.  
 
1. Introduction  
The rollout in autumn 2020 of restrictions 
on social interactions across large parts of 
Northern England and the Midlands in 
response to rising COVID-19 infections 
has placed significant strain on relations 
between central and local government. 
Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham 
became something of a poster boy for the 
fatigue and frustration felt by those in 
regions that have faced some form of local 
lockdown since the summer. His 
comments, at an extraordinary press 
conference outside Bridgewater Hall, that 
“this is no way to run a country in a 
national crisis”, reflected too the bubbling 
anger within local government about 
increasingly poor communications 
between Whitehall and local councils 
seemingly hampering the response to the 
pandemic. 
Amongst the political theatre of a stand-off 
between local and central government not 
seen since the battles waged by the likes 
of Liverpool’s Militant and Ken 
Livingstone’s Greater London Council in 
the 1980s, it would be easy for this story 
to become one of personalities and 
geography: Burnham as the “King of the 
North” defending his people against a 
cruel, London-based elite. 
However, I argue here that the breakdown 
in central-local relations witnessed in 
recent months is the result of longer-term 
institutional faults in England’s sub-
national governance arrangements, and 
that these problems have been 
exacerbated over the last decade due to 
rapid churn in regional and local 
governance arrangements. I suggest there  
is an urgent need for a sustainable 
institutional fix to improve
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Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham addresses the media outside Bridgewater Hall, 
20 October 2020 (Credit: Sky News 2020) 
intergovernmental relations between 
Whitehall and England’s nascent 
combined authorities. The 
recommendations made in this policy 
briefing draw on international experiences, 
devolution to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and attempts by the last 
Labour government to bring greater 
central co-ordination to locally delivered 
services. 
2. A decade of institutional churn 
Since 2010, numerous reforms of local 
and sub-national government in England 
have been undertaken. These include the 
abolition of Regional Development 
Agencies, the establishment of Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, City Deals, and 
the introduction of city-regional combined 
authorities and elected “metro” mayors. 
Further reform is proposed in the 
forthcoming Devolution White Paper 
which, it is promised, will “shift power from 
Whitehall to people on the ground who 
know their areas well, understand their 
priorities, and are empowered with the 
mandate, levers and agency to act upon 
them” (Clarke 2020). 
The role of local and combined authorities 
is not, however, confined solely to delivery 
of services over which they are directly 
responsible. Along with their role as 
democratically elected administrations in 
their own right, local governments are also 
tasked with managing programmes 
designed and funded by central 
government. Indeed, since the mid-
20th century, this has arguably been the 
main role of local authorities, representing 
the organising bureaucracy of the 
centralised English state and operating a 
wide variety of local public services in 
partnership with Whitehall. Yet, outside of 
academic circles, relatively little 
attention is paid to the intergovernmental 
mechanisms that shape these dynamics, 
and the last decade has witnessed the 
removal of various intermediate 
bureaucratic layers (John 2014). 
An example is the somewhat 
unfashionable (both in local government 
and Westminster) Government Offices 
(GOs) for the Regions, established in 
1994. Announcing their abolition in 2010, 
the Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government, Eric 
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Pickles, described them as “agents of 
Whitehall to intervene and interfere in 
localities… a fundamental part of the 
command and control apparatus of 
England’s over-centralised state” (Pickles 
2010). Each of England’s nine regions had 
its own GO, which were designed as “the 
primary means by which a wide range 
of government policies and 
programmes are delivered in the English 
regions”. By 2007, the GOs were 
managing or influencing £7.7bn of central 
government expenditure, much of this 
accounted for by transport (31% of annual 
GO spending) and the Department for 
Communities & Local Government (28%) 
(Mellows-Facer 2010). 
GOs played an important role in 
responding to emergencies such as the 
Fuel Crisis (2000), Foot and Mouth 
Disease (2001) and Swine Flu (2009), 
acting as an intermediary between central 
and local government. Regional 
Resilience Teams (RRTs) operated within 
each GO to assess potential future threats 
and work with central government and 
local authorities to develop appropriate 
responses. While these have been 
replaced to an extent with Local 
Resilience Forums, the 
latter operate more as informal 
partnerships between various local 
stakeholders than an official 
intergovernmental body, and do not have 
anything like the operational resources or 
official remit of RRTs. It is notable that 
Scotland has retained elements of the 
regional resilience model, establishing 
three Regional Resilience Partnerships in 
2013, with 12 Local Resilience 
Partnerships operating at the lower tier. 
3. Intergovernmental relations: 
international best practice 
Intergovernmental relations are 
fundamental to multi-level systems of 
government common in the majority of 
democratic nations. In some cases, the 
principles and structures shaping relations 
between central and sub-national 
government are articulated explicitly in the 
constitution, particularly in federal or 
highly decentralised states such as 
Belgium, Italy and Spain (McEwen et al. 
2020). In others nations, such as the USA 
and Canada, intergovernmental relations 
are more flexible and informal. 
Intergovernmental forums are a common 
institutional fix for coordinating relations 
between national and state governments, 
with the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) one of the most 
comprehensive examples. However, such 
arrangements are inevitably reliant to an 
extent on the enthusiasm of the national 
executive, and are criticised by some for 
slowing down decision-making 
(Phillimore 2013). Earlier this year, in the 
midst of the pandemic, Australian Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison abruptly abolished 
the COAG after 18 years of operation, 
citing his frustration with “the formalities, 
staging… and endless meetings” (Hitch 
2020). 
Even in federal systems in which regional 
and local government have extensive 
autonomy, a level of friction between 
different levels of government is inevitable 
and arguably healthy. In Germany for 
example, several Länder (federal states) 
have diverged from the national strategy. 
The Prime Minister of Saxony-Anhalt has 
been a prominent critic of Angela Merkel 
during the coronavirus pandemic, arguing 
consistently for social distancing 
measures to be relaxed despite sharing a 
political party (the CDU) with the 
Chancellor. However, international 
experience suggests intergovernmental 
structures can help to alleviate conflict and 
mediate between central and local 
interests. 
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Figure 1. Devolution deal coverage in England, indicating number of powers devolved by 
subject 
 
(Credit: Institute for Government 2020) 
4. Intergovernmental relations in the 
age of COVID-19 
The 2014 referendum on Scottish 
independence and tensions 
over Brexit have prompted renewed 
debate in recent years about 
intergovernmental relations between 
Westminster and the UK’s devolved 
nations. A 2018 report from the Bennett 
Institute of Public Policy and the Centre on 
Constitutional Change (McEwen et al. 
2018) argued that it is now essential to 
recognise the political reality that the UK is 
a multi-level political system and 
recommended a review of the “underlying 
principles” of devolution.  
Here, I assert that the establishment of 
elected mayors, a decade of austerity cuts 
to local government, and the 
geographically uneven health and 
economic effects of COVID-19, require a 
similarly urgent review of the structures 
shaping coordination between national 
and sub-national government within 
England. Possible institutional fixes could 
focus on the following. 
The appropriate funding model for 
combined authorities 
The deal-based system currently in place 
involving extensive negotiations between 
central and local government over 
relatively small amounts of money, is 
hugely time consuming. It should be 
replaced by more comprehensive long-
term devolved funding arrangements over 
which local leaders have greater control. 
Clarification of devolved 
responsibilities 
Combined authorities have differing 
devolved responsibilities and powers, with 
Greater Manchester, for example, having 
full control over health and social care 
while other combined authorities (such as 
Liverpool City Region) cover more limited 
policy areas such as transport and skills – 
see Figure 1. Standardisation of the role 
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and responsibilities of sub-national 
government could reduce confusion and 
improve efficiency. 
Creation of an English Leaders’ Forum  
Such a forum was suggested in 
the Bennett Institute of Public Policy and 
the Centre on Constitutional 
Change review. Membership of the forum 
could be linked to the local government 
reforms proposed in the forthcoming 
Devolution White Paper 
to ensure representation from across the 
nation. In Northern England there is 
already a de facto regional council in the 
form of the Transport for the North board 
that meets monthly. 
Formal structures to improve co-
ordination between Whitehall and local 
government  
This could include, for example, regular 
meetings between ministers and local 
leaders to discuss centrally directed but 
locally delivered policy areas such as 
concerning public health, education, 
housing, transport and social care. 
Review of the Strategic 
Coordinating Groups  
These groups currently co-ordinate local 
responses to emergencies. Whether this 
model could be adapted to management 
of longer term health, economic and 
environmental crises, as well as 
developing resilience to future shocks, is 
worth exploring. 
5. Conclusion  
Elected Metro Mayors, such as 
Steve Rotheram in Liverpool City Region 
and Andy Burnham in Greater 
Manchester, have demonstrated their 
extensive soft power over recent weeks, 
frequently appearing on national media to 
represent the interests of their city 
regions. However, the dispute over 
lockdown measures has reemphasised 
the need to consider more 
comprehensively how Westminster and 
Whitehall interact with relatively new 
English sub-national institutions. 
Burnham, and his London counterpart, 
Sadiq Khan, have called for “strong co-
operation between regional and national 
authorities” to tackle COVID-19. Current 
coordinating structures are too informal 
to achieve this, and too reliant on the 
enthusiasm of a small number of 
individuals within central government.  
The establishment of the Northern 
Research Group of Conservative MPs 
also demonstrates frustration from within 
the governing party itself. There will be no 
return of the Government Offices for the 
Regions, but some form of more 
comprehensive structure to coordinate 
intergovernmental relations in England is 
necessary to alleviate future crises. The 
alternative is a constant and damaging 
state of central-local friction. 
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